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WAIVERS OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS VIA 
TREATY: CHINESE SLAVE LABORERS, 
JAPANESE JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE 
SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
ith controversial and limited exceptions, international law pro-
vides sovereign governments with the ability to waive the 
claims of their citizens that arise out of war or international conflict.1 
Nations often dispense with individual claims for war reparations or 
compensation by means of peace treaties with other nations, which estab-
lish the presumption of settling all outstanding issues relating to a war.2 
The reasons for this are logical and imposing: governments require the 
flexibility to establish peace and rebuild societies following eras of war-
fare and turmoil, and the relinquishment of all war claims is often essen-
tial to the attainment of such goals.3 If war-torn and dismantled postwar 
                                                                                                             
 1. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 468 (D. N.J. 1999) (“It is well-
established that countries can waive the war-related claims of their citizens.”); ARNOLD 
DUNCAN MCNAIR, LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 391 (3d ed. 1948) (“[I]t appears that interna-
tional law treats a state as being invested for international purposes with complete power 
to affect by treaty the private rights of its nationals, whether by disposing of their proper-
ty, surrendering their claims, changing their nationality, or otherwise.”). 
 2. Id. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 230 (1796) (“I apprehend that the treaty 
of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the 
matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or 
brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the govern-
ment, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are 
implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed.”). 
 3. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) (“Not infrequently in 
affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the gov-
ernment of another country are ‘sources of friction’ between the two sovereigns. To re-
solve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of 
their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling 
claims by nationals of one state against the government of another ‘are established inter-
national practice reflecting traditional international theory.’”). See also Andrea Gattini, 
To What Extent are State Immunity and Non-Justiciability Major Hurdles to Individuals’ 
Claims for War Damages, 1 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 348, 365 (2003) (“[T]aking into ac-
count the main objective of [peace treaties] which is to re-establish a state of peace and, if 
possible, friendly relations between states in the interest of their communities, it seems 
inconceivable that any individual could disturb or even disrupt the whole process of 
peacemaking for pecuniary satisfaction of a purported right, whose foundation in interna-
W
240 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:1 
nations expend their limited resources and are substantially occupied 
with defending themselves from numerous lawsuits, it would be very 
difficult for such nations to ever reestablish social, economic, and politi-
cal security, much less attain a state wherein they could flourish.4 How-
ever, with the increasing emphasis on human rights in international law,5 
scholars and jurists are beginning to rethink the premise behind allowing 
governments to waive these individual claims, and serious concerns have 
been expressed as to the premise’s legality and fairness, especially in 
cases of grave human rights violations or breaches of jus cogens norms.6 
In balancing the legitimate concerns of governments in waiving claims 
against an individual’s right to bring suit for harms suffered, the question 
remains as to whether a sovereign nation’s ability to waive such claims 
may be infringed, particularly when the underlying harm to a plaintiff is 
an egregious breach of a jus cogens norm.7 
                                                                                                             
tional law is still dubious.”); Dinusha Panditaratne, Rights-Based Approaches to Examin-
ing Waiver Clauses in Peace Treaties: Lessons from the Japanese Forced Labor Litiga-
tion in Californian Courts, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 299, 327 (2005) (“[T]here 
may be instances where a waiver of human rights claims may be indispensable in bring-
ing about the conclusion of a war or other international crisis. In these circumstances, a 
government may need to agree to a waiver clause, even though the resulting impunity 
will undoubtedly be painful to bear for those persons who have suffered at the hands of 
that state and its nationals . . . .”). 
 4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 5. Regarding the rise of human rights in international law, Lord Millett explains: 
The fundamental human rights of individuals, deriving from the inherent digni-
ty of the human person, ha[ve] become a commonplace of international law. 
Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations [i]s taken to impose an obliga-
tion on all states to promote universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The trend [i]s clear. War crimes ha[ve] been 
replaced by crimes against humanity. The way in which a state treat[s] its own 
citizens within its own borders ha[s] become a matter of legitimate concern to 
the international community. 
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. 147, 275 
(1999). 
 6. See Gattini, supra note 3, at 349 (“[I]t is necessary to somehow restrict [a gov-
ernment’s ability to waive its citizens’ claims], in particular through the qualification that 
the state’s renunciation is invalid, should it be made with regard to injury caused by a 
grave violation of peremptory norms.”). See also Panditaratne, supra note 3, at 327 
(“[J]udges should articulate the varied policy considerations at stake and, in particular, 
remain mindful of upholding their responsibility to protect individual human rights to the 
extent possible. Judges should protect rights in a manner reconcilable with the text of the 
waiver clause, while adopting an approach consistent with judicial precedent.”). 
 7. See Michael Winn, Note, Peace Treaty Claim Waivers: The Case of Prince Hans-
Adam II of Liechtenstein and the “Scene at a Roman Well,” 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
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In 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) struggled 
with the issue of whether to invalidate a peace treaty claim waiver in the 
case Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (“Liechtens-
tein”), in which the plaintiff, a monarch of Liechtenstein, attempted to 
reclaim property confiscated by the Czech Republic (part of the former 
Czechoslovakia) in the period following World War II (“WWII”).8 The 
ECHR echoed several previous local German courts’ decisions that 
barred the prince’s claim based on a 1952 treaty between three of the 
Allied Powers and Germany9 in which Germany relinquished all claims 
relating to property or assets appropriated by other nations following the 
war.10 In determining whether the 1952 agreement had legitimately 
waived the plaintiff’s claims, the ECHR utilized a test, which provides 
that any limitation on a plaintiff’s claim—in this case, the treaty waiv-
er—must not “restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a 
way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right [to bring the 
claim] is impaired.”11 Furthermore, the test requires that the limitation a 
government imposes on a plaintiff’s claim must “pursue a legitimate aim 
and . . . [have] a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.”12 Thus, restated 
simply, the ECHR’s “legitimate aim” test consists of the following three 
elements, which, if not met by the waiving nation, require a court to 
deem its treaty waiver invalid: (1) the waiver must seek a legitimate aim; 
(2) the waiver must be reasonably proportional to that legitimate aim; 
and (3) the “very essence” of the claim must not be impaired by the 
waiver.13 
On the other side of the world, this issue is deeply felt, as many WWII-
era Chinese slave labor victims have been bringing claims in Japanese 
                                                                                                             
807, 826 (2006) (“Legal scholars contest the legal limits of a state’s right to waive claims 
on the basis of treaty.”). 
 8. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liech. v. F.R.G., App. No. 42527/98, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1, 3 (2001). 
 9. Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupa-
tion, May 26, 1952, 332 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Convention on the Settlement]. 
 10. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 19–20. For a critique and discussion of the 
ECHR’s decision in Liechtenstein, see Winn, supra note 7. 
 11. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 23. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. Andrea Gattini restates the elements of the ECHR’s “legitimate aim” test 
as follows: “[R]estrictions on access to justice are [lawful], where (a) they pursue a legi-
timate aim; (b) they are proportionate to the aim pursued; and (c) they do not restrict the 
right to the point of extinguishing it.” Andrea Gattini, A Trojan Horse for Sudeten 
Claims? On Some Implications of the Prince of Liechtenstein v. Germany, 13 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 513, 530 (2002). 
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courts against the Japanese government and certain Japanese corpora-
tions since the 1990s, all in the face of a waiver of claims by the Chinese 
government.14 Defendants in these slave labor15 lawsuits have often suc-
ceeded in having the plaintiffs’ claims dismissed based on the Chinese 
government’s renunciation of war reparations16 expressed in a 1972 Joint 
Communiqué 17 and ratified in the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between Japan and the People’s Republic of China.18 Courts have fre-
quently determined that, despite the treaty waiver’s ambiguity with re-
gard to individual claims, it nevertheless precludes them.19 For more than 
a decade, the Supreme Court of Japan failed to comment on the issue of 
                                                                                                             
 14. For a detailed discussion and history of the Chinese slave labor lawsuits in Japan, 
see Timothy Webster, Note, Sisyphus in a Coal Mine: Responses to Slave Labor in Japan 
and the United States, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2006). Some Chinese slave laborers, as 
well as American POWs and primarily Korean sex slaves of the Japanese military (so-
called “jūgun-ianfu” or “military comfort women”), have also sought recourse in U.S. 
courts. See id. at 755–58. For an in-depth discussion of WWII slave labor lawsuits in U.S. 
courts, see John Haberstroh, Note, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Liti-
gation and Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN 
L.J. 253 (2003). 
 15. Like Timothy Webster, see supra note 14, this Note chooses to use the terminolo-
gy “slave labor” as opposed to the euphemistic phrase “forced labor” (“kyōsei rōdō”) 
often utilized by Japanese courts when describing the activity suffered by the Chinese 
plaintiffs during WWII. See, e.g., Chinese Victims of Forced Labor v. Mitsui Mining, 
1809 HANREI JIHŌ 111 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Apr. 26, 2002). The opening caption to the 
case reads: “[t]his case admits claims based in tort for damages by Chinese individuals 
forcibly taken to Japan during the Pacific War [WWII] and made to perform forced labor 
in coal mines (and other venues) against the coal mining firms [under which they worked 
during the war].” Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (author’s translation). 
 16. See Shin Hae Bong, The Right of War Crime Victim to Compensation Before 
National Court: Compensation for Victims of Wartime Atrocities: Recent Developments 
in Japan’s Case Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 187, 190 (2005) (“In many cases, the gov-
ernment of Japan has successfully invoked [China’s waiver of war reparations] to insist 
that the matter of war reparations had already been resolved between [China and Japan] 
and that inter-governmental agreements preclude individuals’ claims for compensation.”). 
 17. Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China (1972), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/china/joint72.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Joint Communiqué]. 
 18. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China 
(1978), available at http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/bilateral_e/bunken_1978joyaku_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Treaty of Peace and Friendship]. 
 19. See William Gao, Note, Overdue Redress: Surveying and Explaining the Shifting 
Japanese Jurisprudence on Victims’ Compensation Claims, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
529, 536 (2007) (“Japanese courts most commonly dismiss [war] compensation suits 
based on bilateral agreements between Japan and the plaintiff’s nation of origin. The 
rationale is that such bilateral agreements effectively resolve questions of compensation 
between the two nations and preclude individual claims.”). 
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war reparations for victims of Japanese slave labor and the treaty waiver 
of 1972.20 However, in the landmark decision of Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu 
Construction (“Nishimatsu”) in April 2007, the Court dismissed the 
claims of Chinese slave laborers, reversing the decision of the Hiroshima 
High Court in the plaintiffs’ favor, and concluding that Chinese WWII 
victims are estopped from bringing claims owing to the waiver, despite 
its ambiguity.21 
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Note reviews the traditional 
interpretation of treaty waivers in international law and an important po-
tential exception to the rule that continues to gain influence as interna-
tional law develops and human rights become a more paramount concern. 
Part II discusses the Liechtenstein case and the ECHR’s legitimate aim 
test. Part III provides background on the Japanese slave labor situation 
and reviews several key Japanese decisions that have interpreted the 
Chinese treaty waiver, culminating with an assessment of the Nishimatsu 
Japanese Supreme Court case. Part IV uses the Japanese slave labor situ-
ation as a test case for the ECHR’s legitimate aim analysis, concluding 
that the test tends to favor the Chinese plaintiffs and allows them to over-
ride their government’s treaty waiver. In conclusion, this Note argues 
that when a treaty waiver is ambiguous and its scope undefined,22 the 
legitimate aim test can serve as a viable method for courts to balance the 
                                                                                                             
 20. William Gao notes that currently there are increasing limitations on appellate 
review within the Japanese legal system, which make it ever more difficult for lower 
court decisions to obtain supreme court review. Id. at 545–46. 
 21. Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1969 HANREI JIHŌ 31 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 27, 
2007), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070427134258.pdf. 
 22. Cf. Gattini, supra note 3, at 366 (“[I]t is usual for states to be extremely careful to 
specify the exact purport of their will, i.e. whether they intend to dispose only of their 
claims; of all possible claims of their citizens under domestic law; to bar access to do-
mestic courts without disposing of the substantive right; or to waive only the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. The admissibility of civil actions before a domestic court must 
then be judged in light of the specific compact.”). As Gattini suggests, clarity is essential 
in the adjudication of claims relating to treaty waivers, and governments are indeed cog-
nizant of the fact, using highly specific language to express their will. Since governments 
require predictable rules to follow when establishing peace, this Note limits the applica-
tion of the legitimate aim test only to situations where the treaty waiver is ambiguous. 
Thus, if the threshold question of ambiguity in a waiver provision is not met, this Note 
would argue that, for efficiency reasons, the test should not be applied at all. This re-
quirement of provision clarity encourages governments to be explicitly clear as to what 
exactly is being waived, and allows them a framework for drafting these waivers with the 
confidence that the floodgates of litigation involving individual claims will not be un-
leashed following a war. 
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traditional governmental ability to waive claims against an individual’s 
right to bring claims.23 
I. TREATY WAIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. General Principles of Treaty Interpretation 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Conven-
tion”) is generally acknowledged as the “codification of the customary 
international law governing treaties” and serves as binding international 
law even for nations that are nonsignatories.24 It provides that treaties are 
to be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms . . . in their context and in the light of [their] ob-
ject and purpose.”25 The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated this principle by 
affirming that, when interpreting the terms of a treaty, “clear import . . . 
controls” unless applying the plain meaning of the language would be 
incongruous with the “intent or expectations” of the parties.26 It follows 
that generally, like all contracts, unless the context and intent of the par-
ties clearly dictate otherwise, the “ordinary meaning” and “clear import” 
of treaty provisions are to be strictly observed.27 In instances where a 
plain reading of the language fails to yield conclusive answers, deference 
should be given to the interpretations of the sovereign governments that 
are parties to the treaty,28 especially when both parties agree to the same 
interpretation.29 
                                                                                                             
 23. The question of whether victims of war crimes have the initial right to bring 
claims under international law, either under a treaty provision such as Article 3 of the 
Hague Convention, or under customary international law, is outside of the scope of this 
Note. The issues entertained herein assume that the plaintiffs discussed already have such 
a right; the essential question is whether a treaty waiver barring such a right may be over-
come. 
 24. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED 
CONFLICT 5 (2005). 
 25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 26. Sumitomo Shoji v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982). 
 27. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing nu-
merous sources). 
 28. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184–85. 
 29. Id. at 185. Interestingly, in order to determine parties’ intent, the United States 
has shown more of an inclination than other countries to look outside of the plain lan-
guage of treaty provisions and interpret them within the larger context of their drafting. 
See BYERS, supra note 24, at 46. In fact, the U.S. delegation to the Vienna Convention 
urged the other countries at the convention to codify this method of interpretation, but the 
overwhelming majority of the participants rejected it, and instead, agreed upon the “ordi-
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B. Claim Waivers via Treaty 
Under traditional principles of international law, sovereign nations 
have the power to relinquish the claims of their citizens through effecting 
peace treaties.30 The policy justifications for this are obvious: govern-
ments require the ability to efficiently orchestrate and reestablish beneficial 
economic and collegial relationships with other nations through mutual 
negotiation and compromise, particularly following an era of warfare, in 
order to establish overall peace, cooperation, and international concord.31 
Accordingly, the goals of a sovereign nation are often furthered by relin-
quishing certain rights, including the individual rights of its citizens, in 
exchange for benefits that help establish the welfare of its people and 
security in the international community.32 A prime example of the tradi-
tional international rule is expressed in Ware v. Hylton, the first U.S. Su-
preme Court case pertaining to the issue.33 In Ware, which involved a 
British subject’s claims against an American citizen for damages that 
arose out of the War of Independence, Justice Chase held: “All . . . inju-
ries or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during 
the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the 
very treaty of peace, and therefore not necessary to be expressed.”34 
Ware therefore illustrates that, traditionally, international law considers 
individual claims resulting from war-time activity to be automatically 
dissolved by a government’s signing of a peace treaty, there ultimately 
being no need for a sovereign nation to waive such claims expressly.35 
                                                                                                             
nary meaning” interpretation, which was ultimately adopted by the Vienna Convention. 
Id.; Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(1). 
 30. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) (discussing the benefits 
for governments in waiving the individual claims of their citizens as a means of resolving 
postwar discord between nations). 
 33. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). 
 34. Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
 35. Andrea Gattini argues that the primary concern of courts when dealing with 
claims waived through international settlement is that they are perceived as inherently 
nonjusticiable, even if the judges deciding the cases do not expressly enunciate this view. 
She states, “Even if the [nonjusticiability] argument is not always clearly articulated, 
domestic courts are aware that the complex issues of post war settlements exceed the 
scope of their jurisdiction and should therefore be left to governments, which are in a 
better position to reach overall satisfactory and internationally binding settlements.”  
Gattini, supra note 3, at 384. 
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Undoubtedly, international law has developed since Ware,36 but its es-
sential principle—that through enacting treaties, governments have con-
trol over the war-related claims of their citizens—is still the prevailing 
view.37 In fact, Ware was recently cited in Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, a 
2006 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in-
volving claims against Japan by WWII-era “military comfort women” 
from various East Asian countries (including China).38 In Hwang, the 
court explained: “[c]ontrary to [the Ware rule], the [“military comfort 
women”] insist the treaties between Japan and [their nations] preserved 
the claims of individuals by failing to mention them.”39 The D.C. Circuit 
was unsympathetic to their argument, however, refusing to interpret the 
respective treaty provisions, and dismissing their claims as involving 
nonjusticiable political questions.40 
In contrast with the traditional rule allowing governments complete ju-
risdiction over their citizens’ claims, a noted scholar of international law 
has remarked: “[t]he right of states to dispose of claims is increasingly 
being challenged.”41 This results in part from an increasing worldwide 
                                                                                                             
 36. See Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International 
Law Recognize a Victim’s Private Right of Action? Lessons After 1945, 20 BERK. J. INT’L 
L. 296, 297 (2002) (arguing that “the classical approach, which considers war-related 
individual claims as being subsumed by the intergovernmental arrangements for peace,” 
has undergone “revolutionary” changes in recent years). 
 37. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 273–74 (D.N.J. 1999). 
Burger-Fischer uses Ware as the basis for part of its decision to dismiss the treaty-waived 
claims of Nazi slave labor victims and holds that, “under international law[,] claims for 
compensation by individuals harmed by war-related activity belong exclusively to the 
state of which the individual is a citizen.” Id. at 273. Therefore, under Burger-Fischer, a 
nation’s power over its citizens’ war compensation claims is taken a step further, from 
control to ownership, i.e., “belong[ing] exclusively to the state.” Id. 
 38. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 39. Id. at 51. 
 40. Id. at 51–53. 
 41. Gattini, supra note 3, at 350. See also Dolzer, supra note 36, at 297. Dolzer dis-
cusses a progressive trend away from the traditional rule and toward an emphasis on the 
individual’s right to adjudicate claims: 
A decade ago, it would have been generally understood that only the classical 
approach, which considers war-related individual claims as being subsumed by 
the intergovernmental arrangements for peace, was consistent with internation-
al law as reflected in practice and doctrine. However, the 1990s have witnessed 
a remarkable, and in some respects revolutionary, attempt to restructure the 
classical approach to peacemaking and the resolution of matters relating to the 
international consequences of war. In what may be described as an attempt to 
replace the traditional exclusive government-to-government process of nego-
tiating a comprehensive peace treaty, efforts were undertaken to adjudicate 
claims by individuals before regular courts of law. 
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sensitivity regarding human rights issues, as codified in international 
agreements,42 and the perception that individuals possess complete own-
ership of their own right to bring compensation claims for wrongs they 
have suffered.43 Although there is little evidence to indicate that courts 
are following this ideological shift, and no clear indication of the restric-
tions, if any, imposed upon a government’s ability to waive individual 
claims via treaty,44 one compelling theory of limitation on the  traditional 
rule is the jus cogens exception.45 
C. The Jus Cogens Exception 
Perhaps the most persuasive potential limitation on governmental 
waivers of claims is the proposition that individual claims for breaches of 
jus cogens norms cannot be waived.46 Jus cogens norms, also commonly 
referred to as “peremptory norms,” are a body of the most supreme hu-
man rights protections considered common to and binding upon all na-
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 42. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. 
147, 275 (1999). 
 43. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Fundamental Human Right to Prosecution and Compen-
sation, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 77, 86 (2001) (“[C]laims based on violations of law 
are a form of property that cannot be cavalierly waived by a nation . . . .”). 
 44. Winn, supra note 7, at 826, 829. 
 45. See id. at 829. Winn mentions an “alternative forum principle” as another possible 
limitation on a government’s ability to waive claims: 
[An] alternative forum principle . . . requires a state to offer an alternative fo-
rum such as a special tribunal [in exchange for waiving claims]. . . . An alterna-
tive forum serves a middle ground. . . . While the individual retains at least 
some right to bring a claim, the waiving state serves its interests in judicial effi-
ciency and minimization of potentially aggravating claims by raising the bur-
den of proof or by offering less stringent procedural protections to the claimant. 
Id. at 827–28. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the U.S. Supreme 
Court seemed to apply a version of this principle when it held that the executive branch 
of the U.S. government had legally waived the claims of its citizens taken hostage in Iran 
by creating a separate arbitration “claims tribunal” where the aggrieved could bring their 
claims. Id. at 686–87 (“Our conclusion [that the president legitimately waived the plain-
tiffs’ claims against Iran] is buttressed by the fact that the means chosen by the President 
to settle the claims of American nationals provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tri-
bunal, which is capable of providing meaningful relief.”). However, Winn contends that 
this rule is probably limited to claims of foreign individuals waived by executive order, 
and that war compensation claims waived by treaty are not within its scope. See Winn, 
supra note 7, at 828. 
 46. See Van Dyke, supra note 43, at 86 (“Treaties and amnesty agreements purport-
ing to waive claims [for violations of basic norms of human decency] or exonerate human 
rights abusers . . . have no . . . validity . . . .”). 
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tions.47 Generally accepted jus cogens norms include prohibitions against 
military aggression, genocide, racial discrimination, torture, and sla-
very.48 Even before the nomenclature came into popular usage, the con-
cept underlying jus cogens norms carried weight among judges, who be-
gan to characterize certain rights as “fundamental,” “inherent,” or “in-
alienable.”49 The Vienna Convention codifies the concept and defines a 
jus cogens norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of gen-
eral international law having the same character.”50 The Vienna Convention 
further states that any treaty conflicting with a jus cogens norm is per se 
invalid.51 Therefore, though creatures of customary international law, jus 
cogens norms are such significant human rights safeguards that they 
override any conflicting treaty provision, even trumping the “clear import” 
interpretation rule of treaties.52 As an example, two bordering nations 
cannot contract through treaty to jointly massacre an unwelcome ethnic 
minority population common to both nations; the jus cogens norm 
against genocide would render their treaty null and void under interna-
tional law.53 
Despite the significance and weight of jus cogens norms in internation-
al law, it remains unclear whether claim waivers for their violation can or 
should be invalidated.54 Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, there is con-
siderable support for the proposition that courts should not allow gov-
ernments to waive jus cogens claims, the most influential of which is the 
                                                                                                             
 47. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 488–90 (Oxford 
1966) (6th ed. 2003). 
 48. See id. at 488–89; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702, cmt. 
n (1987) (“Not all human rights norms are peremptory norms (jus cogens), but those in 
clauses (a) to (f) of this section [including clause (b), ‘slavery or slave trade,’] are, and an 
international agreement that violates them is void.”); International Law Commission, 
Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (2001), art. 40, cmts. 
4–5, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[hereinafter Articles on Responsibility of States]. Among a number of generally accepted 
peremptory norms, the Commission lists prohibitions against “slavery and the slave trade, 
genocide, and racial discrimination and apartheid.” Id. art. 40, cmt. 4. 
 49. See BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 488. 
 50. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 53. 
 51. Id. (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a perempto-
ry norm of general international law.”). 
 52. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.N.J. 1999) (discuss-
ing the “clear import” interpretation rule of treaties). 
 53. See BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 489. 
 54. See Winn, supra note 7, at 829. 
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work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”).55 In 2001, in its ef-
forts to restate the international law regarding wrongful acts committed 
by sovereign nations, the ILC adopted the Articles on Responsibility of 
States for International Wrongful Acts (“Articles on Responsibility of 
States”).56 Article 40 of this work deals with state liability for breaches of 
jus cogens norms.57 Article 41 provides that “[n]o state shall recognize as 
lawful a situation created by a serious breach within Article 40, nor render 
aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”58 The ILC’s commentary 
to Article 41 illuminates the Article’s intent by interpreting it to mean 
that not only are breaches of jus cogens norms unlawful, but even a 
State’s ratification, whether explicit or implicit, of a previous breach is 
unacceptable, as it offends international principles and sentiments.59 
Comment 9 to Article 41 specifies that an injured state cannot sanction 
harm sustained from another nation’s breach of a jus cogens norm, “since 
the breach by definition concerns the international community as a whole 
[and] waiver or recognition induced from the injured State by the re-
sponsible State cannot preclude the international community interest in 
ensuring a just and appropriate settlement.”60 Therefore, according to 
the ILC’s rationale, claims for grave violations of human rights cannot be 
waived, as each and every violation is an international concern, not only 
a matter among several states, and the conscience of the international 
community would only be offended by neglecting to remedy, or at least 
entertain the claim for, such a breach. 
Certain courts and judges have echoed the ILC’s sentiments in limiting 
a nation’s ability to escape accountability for breaches of jus cogens 
norms. For example, in Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan, a case of the 
British House of Lords dealing with torture claims against a former Cuban 
head of state, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that he was 
exempt from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.61 Lord 
                                                                                                             
 55. In order to actualize Article 13 of the U.N. Charter, which delegates to the Gener-
al Assembly the obligation to “initiate studies and make recommendations” toward inter-
national cooperation and international law’s development and codification, U.N. Charter 
art. 13, para. 1, the General Assembly established the International Law Commission in 
1947 for the “promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.” G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947). 
 56. Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 48. 
 57. Id. art. 40. 
 58. Id. art. 41. 
 59. Id. art. 41, cmts. 1–14. 
 60. Id. art. 41, cmt. 9 (emphasis added). 
 61. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. 
147 (1999). Under the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, a nation (or one of its 
official representatives) acting within its “sovereign character” will not be made subject 
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Phillips stated: as “torture is prohibited by international law and . . . the 
prohibition against torture has the character of jus cogens[,] . . . it is . . . 
accepted that officially sanctioned torture is forbidden by international 
law.”62 
In Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,63 although the ECHR refused to deny 
Kuwait’s sovereign immunity defense against a torture claim, eight of 
the seventeen judges dissented, arguing that as a rule of jus cogens, and 
therefore “hierarchically higher than any other rule of international law,” 
a torture claim overrides a government’s ability to disregard it and to 
escape liability by invoking the sovereign immunity defense.64 Although 
these European cases deal primarily with the sovereign immunity de-
fense, not treaty waivers, they are emblematic of the trend in internation-
al law reflected in the substance of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility 
of States. They echo the ILC’s premise that governments should not be 
allowed to disregard or ratify claims for breaches of jus cogens norms.65 
Judging from this trend, a persuasive argument can be made that gov-
ernments must not be permitted to waive the claims of their citizens 
when such claims are for breaches of jus cogens norms, as international 
law regards them as supreme—almost sacred—rules with powerful over-
riding capabilities.66  
                                                                                                             
to the jurisdiction of a foreign court without such nation’s consent. See Schooner Exchange 
v. McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116, 123–25 (1812). However, this doctrine has largely 
given way in modern times to a more limiting theory of sovereign immunity, where a 
nation will be unable to invoke the defense for acts arising out of its capacity as a com-
mercial player. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of 
Foreign Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R. 3d 322 § 2 (1969) 
(“Growing concern for individual rights and public morality, coupled with the increasing 
entry of governments into what had previously been regarded as private pursuits, has led 
a substantial number of nations to abandon the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in 
favor of a restrictive theory, under which a foreign sovereign is not granted immunity 
from suit where the action arises out of its commercial activities, as distinguished from 
acts done in its sovereign capacity.”). 
 62. Regina, 1 A.C. at 290 (emphasis added). 
 63. Al-Adsani v. U.K., App. No. 35763/97, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (2001). 
 64. Id. at 111–12 (Rozakis, J., Caflisch, J., Wildhaber, J., Costa, J., Cabral Barreto, J., 
& Vadic, J. dissenting). 
 65. See Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 47, art. 41, cmt. 9. 
 66. Andrea Gattini argues that, even if international law does not yet recognize claims 
for violations of jus cogens norms that have been waived by a claimant’s nation, the ac-
knowledgment of such claims could ensure legitimate international settlements: 
[G]overnments . . . are in a [good] position to reach overall satisfactory and in-
ternationally binding settlements. It does not, however, follow that states are 
free to waive any claim and to reach any settlement: they may not reciprocally 
condone violations of those rules of humanitarian law which belong to jus co-
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II. THE ECHR’S “LEGITIMATE AIM” TEST: PRINCE HANS-ADAM II OF 
LIECHTENSTEIN V. GERMANY 
A. Background of the Prince’s Claims and Chapter 6 of the Convention 
on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation 
Prince Hans-Adam II’s claims arose out of events immediately follow-
ing WWII.67 His father, a monarch of the German-speaking state of 
Liechtenstein, which was a neutral power during the war, owned a castle 
in the territory of present-day Czech Republic, in which were kept family 
treasures dating back to at least the eighteenth century, including a che-
rished family painting, Szene an einem römischen Kalkofen (“the 
Szene”).68 In 1945, the Czechoslovak government issued “the Beneš De-
crees,” one of which, “Decree no. 12,” allowed for the “confiscation and 
accelerated allocation” of certain German-owned property remaining 
within the Czechoslovak territory in order to fulfill war reparations for 
the harms caused by Germany during the war. 69 Thereafter, the Czechos-
lovak government confiscated the prince’s family castle, along with its 
accompanying personal property, including the Szene.70 In 1951, the 
prince’s father, in an attempt to reclaim his property, brought suit in the 
Bratislava Administrative Court, which dismissed his petition, interpret-
ing the monarch as a German national within the meaning of the Beneš 
Decrees, and therefore subject to the confiscation measures therein.71 
In 1952, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
signed the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the 
War and the Occupation (“Settlement Convention”).72 Chapter 6 of the 
Settlement Convention states that Germany shall “in the future raise no 
objections against the measures which have been, or will be, carried out 
with regard to German external assets or other property . . . seized . . . by 
the Three Powers with other Allied countries, neutral countries or former 
allies of Germany.”73 Chapter 6 thus waives claims regarding German 
                                                                                                             
gens. In such situations, individuals’ claims, although dubiously founded in in-
ternational law, could have the beneficial effect of spurring states to reach set-
tlements consistent with international law. 
Gattini, supra note 3, at 348. 
 67. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liech. v. F.R.G., App. No. 42527/98, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1, 9–10 (2001). 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 9, 28–29. 
 72. Convention on the Settlement, supra note 9. 
 73. Id. ch. 6, art. 3(1). 
252 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:1 
property seized outside of its borders in the aftermath of WWII. Fur-
thermore, Chapter 6 affirms that “[n]o claim or action shall be admissi-
ble against [. . .] international organizations, foreign governments or per-
sons . . . ” and is therefore unambiguous and express, clearly denoting 
that all German claims with regard to confiscated external property, in-
cluding individual claims, are to be relinquished.74 
In 1991, the prince discovered that the City of Brno, Czech Republic, 
loaned the Szene to the Cologne municipality, and he obtained an interim 
injunction from the Cologne Regional Court ordering the Szene to be 
delivered to a temporary bailiff.75 From 1992 to 1998, the prince fiercely 
litigated through the German courts in an attempt to reclaim his father’s 
painting.76 However, the German courts consistently found that Chapter 
6 of the Settlement Convention waived his claims, agreeing with the 
1951 Bratislava Administrative Court decision that interpreted the mo-
narchs as German nationals.77 
B. The ECHR Appeal and the “Legitimate Aim” Test 
In 1998, the prince filed an appeal with the European Court of Human 
Rights, claiming, inter alia, that by dismissing his claims on the basis of 
Chapter 6, the German courts had unfairly restricted his right of access to 
the courts and thereby violated Article 6 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European 
Convention”).78 The ECHR found that under its body of case law, the 
right of access to the court expressed in Article 6 of the European Con-
vention may be subject to limitations.79 Placing the burden of proof on 
the waiving nation, the court proposed that in order to validate a limita-
tion on an individual’s right of access to the courts, three elements need 
to be proved: (1) the limitation needs to pursue a legitimate aim; (2) such 
legitimate aim and the means employed to secure it must bear a “reason-
able relationship of proportionality” to each other; and (3) the limitation 
must not completely obliterate or impede the “very essence” of the indi-
vidual’s right of access to the court.80 Therefore, in order to determine 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. ch. 6, art. 3(3) (emphasis added). 
 75. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 10. 
 76. Id. at 10–15. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 21. Article 6 of the Convention reads in pertinent part: “[i]n the determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing . . . .” European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 79. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 23. 
 80. Id. 
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whether the claim waiver expressed in Chapter 6 of the Settlement Con-
vention validly waived the prince’s claims, the ECHR applied this “legi-
timate aim” test.81 
With regard to the first prong, the ECHR determined that Germany had 
a legitimate aim in waiving claims for postwar property confiscation via 
Chapter 6 of the Settlement Convention.82 It found that the Allied Pow-
ers’ victory and occupation of Germany immediately following the war 
stripped the defeated power of its sovereignty and consigned it “under 
the supreme authority of the [Allied Powers].”83 Indeed, the Allied Pow-
ers retained the ability to exercise broad rights over Germany and main-
tained military forces therein.84 Considering this backdrop, Germany at 
the time of the Settlement Convention could hardly afford to negotiate 
with the Allies on equal terms and at arm’s length; instead, it was in a 
highly compromised position, forced to barter for the return of its very 
sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.85 Under these circums-
tances, Germany’s waiver of individual property claims expressed in 
Chapter 6 was proper in light of the legitimate aim to re-secure its na-
tional sovereignty.86 
The ECHR also found the second prong, the proportionality require-
ment, fulfilled as to the legitimate aim of recovering state sovereignty.87 
In weighing the interests of the prince in bringing his claim against the 
legitimate aim of the government in achieving sovereignty and unity, the 
court “attache[d] particular significance to the nature of the applicant’s 
property claims in respect of the painting . . . .”88 It held that an interest 
in litigating such claims “was not sufficient to outweigh the vital public 
interest in regaining sovereignty and unifying Germany.”89 In conse-
quence, the means of terminating property claims using the Chapter 6 
waiver was found proportionate to Germany’s legitimate aim of attaining 
sovereignty.90 
As to the third prong of the legitimate aim test, whether the limitation 
frustrates the “very essence” of the individual’s claim, the ECHR deter-
mined that the waiver did not impair the essence of the prince’s right to 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. at 25–31. 
 82. Id. at 27. 
 83. Id. at 25–26. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 26–27. 
 86. Id. at 27. 
 87. Id. at 29. 
 88. Id. at 28. 
 89. Id. at 29. 
 90. Id. 
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bring his claim.91 Although the court did not provide a clear analysis of 
this prong,92 the basis of its determination can be inferred from its sug-
gestion that there was a more proper forum for the prince’s claim—to 
wit, the Czech or Slovak Republics—and that his father had already 
brought his claim in Czechoslovakia in 1951.93 The ECHR appeared to 
suggest that if there were another forum that the claimant has (or had) 
access to, the “very essence” of his or her right would not be frustrated.94 
Accordingly, since the prince’s father had already brought the claim be-
fore the Bratislava Administrative Court, the ECHR determined that the 
“very essence” of his right had not been impaired by the waiver.95 As a 
result of the court’s findings, the waiver of Chapter 6 was upheld as valid 
over the prince’s claim.96 
Although it is questionable whether the ECHR’s legitimate aim test 
was correctly or fairly applied in the Liechtenstein case,97 it could still 
serve as an effective method for balancing the interests of individuals in 
bringing their war-related claims against the governmental interest in 
securing policy goals by waiving such claims through peace treaties. 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. 
 92. “[The ECHR] reached the conclusion that the [‘very essence’] condition was  
satisfied, by rather clumsily drawing on the existence of the other two conditions.” Gatti-
ni, supra note 13, at 533. 
 93. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 28–29 (“[T]he exclusion of German jurisdic-
tion did not affect the great majority of such cases where property had remained within 
the territory of the expropriating State. The genuine forum for the settlement disputes in 
respect of these expropriation measures was, in the past, the courts of the former Cze-
choslovakia and, subsequently, the courts of the Czech or Slovak Republics. Indeed, in 
1951 the applicant’s father had availed himself of the opportunity of challenging the ex-
propriation in question before the Bratislava Administrative Court.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Winn, supra note 7, at 816–17. Winn criticizes the ECHR’s decision and 
writes that “[the prince’s] situation is Kafkaesque: he is a citizen of a neutral country 
who, after being deemed German by a court in Bratislava, has been unable to compel the 
return of a painting confiscated as part of a World War II reparation scheme between 
Germany and Czechoslovakia.” Id. at 816. Winn continues to describe “three violations 
of rights guaranteed to the prince under international law” that the ECHR failed to reme-
dy, namely, “(1) confiscation of the prince’s property by a foreign state without compen-
sation; (2) determination of the prince’s citizenship by a foreign state; and (3) imposition 
on the prince of a treaty not signed by Liechtenstein.” Id. at 816–17. 
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III. CHINESE WWII SLAVE LABOR LITIGATION IN JAPAN AND CHINA’S 
WAIVER OF CLAIMS IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ 
A. Origins of Slave Labor Litigation in Japan 
In order to relieve internal labor shortages during the course of WWII, 
from 1942 to 1945 the Japanese government orchestrated the abduction 
and transportation to Japan of approximately 37,500 Chinese slave labor-
ers.98 After arrival in Japan, the laborers were subjected to extreme hard-
ship, including illness, severe working conditions, malnutrition, and vi-
olence.99 Owing to the harshness of their treatment, about 17.5% of the 
slave laborers brought to Japan died during the course of the ordeal.100 
After Japan’s defeat and the conclusion of the war, it signed a formal 
peace treaty with most of the Allied Powers in 1951 in San Francisco 
(“San Francisco Treaty”).101 Although Article 14 of the San Francisco 
Treaty expressly waives all present and future war compensation claims 
of the Allied Powers and their nationals,102 China (along with several 
other nations previously in conflict with Japan) was not a party to the 
treaty.103 Recognizing that the San Francisco Treaty was incomplete 
without the inclusion of all relevant parties, it authorized Japan to enact 
bilateral peace treaties with nonparticipating nations.104 In 1972, Japan 
endeavored to complete one of these bilateral peace treaties by signing a 
Joint Communiqué with the People’s Republic of China.105 Article 5 of 
                                                                                                             
 98. Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1969 HANREI JIHŌ 31, 32 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 27, 
2007). The number of Korean slave laborers transported to Japan during the same period 
is estimated at approximately 290,000. Id. 
 99. Id. at 32–33. 
 100. Id. at 33. 
 101. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 46 [hereinafter San Fran-
cisco Treaty]. 
 102. Id. ch. V, art. 14(b) (“[T]he Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the 
Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any 
actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and 
claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.”). 
 103. Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 33. 
 104. San Francisco Treaty, supra note 101, art. 26. 
 105. Joint Communiqué, supra note 17. Actually, Japan had previously signed a peace 
treaty with the Republic of China in 1952 in Taipei (“Taipei Treaty”). Treaty of Peace 
between the Republic of China and Japan (1952), available at http://www.taiwandocuments. 
org/taipei01.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Taipei Treaty]. The government 
of the Republic of China, based in Taiwan at the time, was the competing government 
vying for power against the communist People’s Republic of China, but became virtually 
powerless after the communist government secured dominance; hence, the Taipei Treaty, 
from a practical point of view, became completely irrelevant with regard to Chi-
nese/Japanese postwar relations. See Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 33–34. 
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the Joint Communiqué reads: “[t]he Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the 
Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war repa-
ration from Japan.”106 There is no further explanation or definition of the 
term “war reparations” found in the Joint Communiqué, however, leav-
ing the reader unsure as to whether the waiver is meant to include indi-
vidual compensation claims by victims of war, or simply refers only to 
governmental claims.107 A formal peace treaty between the two nations 
was eventually signed in 1978, in which the terms of the Communiqué 
were ratified.108 
B. The Japanese Judiciary’s Treatment of Article 5 of the Joint Commu-
niqué 
In 1986, the People’s Republic of China established a law that made it 
permissible for Chinese nationals to travel outside of their nation’s bor-
ders, enabling Chinese WWII victims to bring their claims in Japanese 
courts.109 Consequently, following the example of earlier Korean slave 
labor litigation, a group of Chinese slave labor plaintiffs brought their 
first suit in Tokyo District Court in 1995 against the copper mining firm 
under which they were forced to work during the war.110 In holding that 
the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under the Civil Code’s statute of limi-
tations for tort claims,111 the Tokyo District Court avoided addressing the 
merits of their claims.112 This case initiated a trend among Japanese 
judges handling Chinese slave labor cases—that of dismissing war com-
pensation claims by utilizing a handful of defenses before getting to a 
discussion of their merits.113 
                                                                                                             
 106. Joint Communiqué, supra note 17, art. 5. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 18 (“Confirming that . . . the Joint 
Communiqué constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the 
two countries . . . the principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué should be strictly 
observed . . . .”). 
 109. Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 34. 
 110. Geng Zhun v. Kajima, 988 HANREI TAIMUZU 250 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 1997). 
 111. MINPŌ, art. 724 (“The right to demand compensation for damages which has ari-
sen from an unlawful act shall lapse by prescription if not exercised within three years 
from the time when the injured party or his/her legal representative became aware of such 
damage and of the identity of the person who caused it, the same shall apply if twenty 
years have elapsed from the time when the unlawful act was committed.”). 
 112. Kajima, 988 HANREI TAIMUZU at 254. 
 113. See Webster, supra note 14, at 753–54. Webster states that statutes of limitations 
and government immunity are the two most widely used defenses applied by Japanese 
courts in the slave labor context. He proceeds to describe these defenses as technical and 
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Initially favoring Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué as an effective le-
gal defense, Japanese courts were largely successful in disposing of Chi-
nese claims by concluding that, ipso facto, any Chinese citizen’s individ-
ual claim arising out of WWII had been settled by agreement of both 
governments and was thus barred.114 Despite this trend, as the below cas-
es demonstrate, several district court judges gradually began to refuse to 
follow their colleagues’ formalist interpretation of Article 5 by scrutiniz-
ing the ambiguous language in a larger context of international policy 
and fairness. 
In 2002, analyzing the scope of Article 5’s waiver of claims, the Fuku-
oka District Court in Chinese Victims of Forced Labor v. Mitsui Mining 
assigned particular significance to a 1995 statement by the Chinese for-
eign minister in which he expressly denied that the People’s Republic of 
China had any intention of including individual claims when it nego-
tiated Article 5’s waiver, declaring instead that it was meant to be limited 
to the government’s war reparation claims.115 The Fukuoka court deter-
mined that this affirmation clarified the ambiguity in China’s waiver and 
allowed the Chinese plaintiffs in this case to bring their claims on the 
merits.116 
In Chinese Victims of Sexual Violence v. Japan, a case involving 
WWII Chinese “military comfort women,” the Tokyo District Court ex-
amined the ambiguity of the phrase “war reparations” in Article 5 of the 
Joint Communiqué.117 It distinguished “war reparations” from the phrase 
“compensation for injury,” the former being inherently a state issue and 
the latter being payment for a claim that only an individual can bring.118 
Based on this distinction, the Tokyo District Court held that the clear 
import of the provision illustrates that the waiver in Article 5 applies on-
ly to the Chinese government’s “war reparations,” not to individual com-
pensation claims.119 
                                                                                                             
as having “talismanic properties,” which allow judges to arbitrarily decide cases on the 
“whims of spells.” Id. at 754. Another typical technical defense successful in Japanese 
courts when war reparation claims are brought under international law rather than Japa-
nese civil law includes barring claims owing to the lack of an underlying treaty provision 
that would explicitly allow such claims. See Hae Bong, supra note 16, at 189–90. 
 114. See Gao, supra note 19, at 536; Hae Bong, supra note 16, at 189–90. 
 115. See Chinese Victims of Forced Labor v. Mitsui Mining, 1809 HANREI JIHŌ 111, 
121 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Apr. 26, 2002). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Chinese Victims of Sexual Violence v. Japan, 1127 HANREI TAIMUZU 281, 295 
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Apr. 24, 2003). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (“The Joint Communiqué should be interpreted within the basic framework of 
international law. Claims against our country as the assailing nation during the Second 
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In Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co., arguably the greatest victory for slave 
laborer plaintiffs,120 the Niigata District Court also interpreted China’s 
waiver in Article 5 to refer only to governmental claims.121 The court 
emphasized that the language of the provision explicitly states that the 
government of the People’s Republic of China renounces all war repara-
tions, but makes no mention that private, individual claims are to be re-
linquished.122 In reaching this conclusion (like the Fukuoka District 
Court in Mitsui Mining), the court in Rinko gave deference to official 
representations by Chinese public officials—particularly the 1995 state-
ment of the Chinese foreign minister—in adhering to the interpretation of 
Article 5 as meaning only a renunciation of governmental claims.123 
In July 2004, the Hiroshima High Court in Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu 
Construction refused to construe Article 5 as barring the claims of Chi-
nese slave labor victims forced to work in coal mines during the war, and 
reversed a district court decision124 in favor of the defendant compa-
nies.125 For similar reasons as the above-cited district court cases, it held 
that the claims China waived in Article 5 definitively stopped at govern-
ment-specific war reparations, and that since individual claims were not 
at all mentioned, they should not be barred.126 
                                                                                                             
World War by the People’s Republic of China . . . for compensation, so-called ‘war repa-
rations,’ are all that is waived; claims against our nation by individual Chinese victims 
for compensation, so-called ‘compensation for injury,’ are nowhere relinquished.”) (au-
thor’s translation). 
 120. This case is considered particularly significant for Chinese slave labor plaintiffs 
because it marks the first time a Japanese court recognized liability on the part of the 
Japanese government—in addition to a defendant corporation—for harms suffered by the 
slave laborers. See Hae Bong, supra note 16, at 196. 
 121. Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co., 50 SHŌMU GEPPŌ 3444, 3603 (Niigata Dist. Ct., 
Mar. 26, 2004). 
 122. Id. at 3606–08. 
 123. Id. The court in Rinko also found influential an official statement by the Chinese 
government expressed on the website of the Japanese Embassy to China, which articu-
lated that, during the Joint Communiqué’s negotiation process, the People’s Republic of 
China, acting in response to Japan’s expression of great responsibility and deep remorse 
for the harm it had caused to the Chinese people during the war, agreed to relinquish all 
claims for war reparations. Id. at 3607. Notwithstanding this fact, the statement purported 
that the government of China urges Japan to take proper measures and respond with se-
riousness to protect the interests of individual Chinese WWII victims (such as victims of 
chemical weapons, slave laborers, and “military comfort women”). Id. at 3607–08. The 
court was moved by this statement and concluded that, based on the premise that it relin-
quished all its war reparation claims, the government of China expects that Japan take 
responsibility to resolve outstanding issues in regard to individual claims. Id. at 3608. 
 124. 1110 HANREI TAIMUZU 253 (Hiroshima Dist. Ct., July 9, 2002). 
 125. 1865 HANREI JIHŌ 62 (Hiroshima High Ct., July 9, 2004). 
 126. Id. at 89–91. 
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C. The Japanese Supreme Court’s Review of Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu 
In April 2007, the Supreme Court of Japan accepted the Nishimatsu 
case for review and, for the first time in the course of slave labor litiga-
tion in Japan, endeavored to determine the scope of Article 5’s waiver.127 
The court admitted that the waiver was ambiguous and its scope unde-
fined.128 Then it unanimously held that Article 5 should be interpreted as 
barring all Chinese citizens’ individual claims arising out of WWII, 
based primarily on two reasons: (1) the historical evidence shows that the 
Joint Communiqué was the product of negotiation and compromise be-
tween Japan and China, which were conditioned upon China accepting a 
conclusion to the war and the resolution of all outstanding issues in ex-
change for good consideration; and (2) the Joint Communiqué must be 
interpreted within the framework of the San Francisco Treaty, which had 
as its main goal the attainment of peace by means of settling all claims—
including individual ones—and resolving outstanding issues.129 
With regard to the first reason for finding that Article 5 waived indi-
vidual claims, the supreme court looked at the historical background and 
negotiations behind the signing of the Joint Communiqué and found that 
China and Japan had demanded the acceptance of certain basic principles 
as preconditions to signing.130 The court stated that the Chinese govern-
ment had three basic requirements: (1) that Japan recognize the commun-
ist government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole, legitimate, 
and lawful representative of China; (2) that Japan recognize Taiwan as 
the territory solely of the People’s Republic of China; and (3) that the 
Taipei Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China131 be deemed 
illegal and without effect.132 In contrast, Japan expected the People’s Re-
public of China to accept similar terms to those reflected in the Taipei 
Treaty and officially acknowledge the conclusion of WWII and the com-
plete termination of all war reparation claims and other outstanding is-
                                                                                                             
 127. Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1969 HANREI JIHŌ 31 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 27, 
2007). 
 128. Id. at 36 (“[I]t is unclear by just looking at [Article 5] whether its substance 
waives claims in addition to war reparations, and if it does, whether the waiver is meant 
to include individual claims by Chinese citizens.”) (author’s translation). 
 129. Id. at 36–37. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Taipei Treaty, supra note 105. The obvious reason the People’s Republic of Chi-
na was so interested in invalidating the Taipei Treaty was because it was signed by its 
competing, noncommunist, Chinese government, the Republic of China, which it, of 
course, did not recognize. 
 132. Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 36. 
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sues.133 The court illustrated that, from these different viewpoints, 
through much effort and negotiation, both countries acceded to each oth-
er’s demands and came to mutual understanding and agreement, the 
terms of which were memorialized in the Joint Communiqué (albeit im-
perfectly since it failed to clearly enunciate a waiver of individual 
claims).134 From this historical context of negotiation and mutual effort 
toward postwar stabilization, the court concluded that both nations in-
tended the Joint Communiqué to be a peace treaty of great significance 
with the force to bring the war, all outstanding issues, and all related 
claims—including all individual claims—to a definitive end.135 
In addition, the Court determined that, as a component of the series of 
events that comprise WWII’s epilogue, the Joint Communiqué should be 
understood and interpreted only within the framework of the San Fran-
cisco Treaty, the primary peace treaty governing postwar matters be-
tween Japan and its enemies, and should not deviate from its substance 
or purport.136 The court reasoned that the parties to the San Francisco 
Treaty, understanding that individual claims would obstruct their critical 
goal of establishing a conclusion to the war and overarching peace, wise-
ly crafted the treaty to cause all parties to specifically waive all claims.137 
Because the claims waiver of Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué should 
be interpreted only within this framework, the court concluded, it should 
be construed to include individual claims, as does the San Francisco 
Treaty.138 Therefore, the Chinese plaintiffs were found to have no right to 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. In contrast with the ambiguity in Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué, Article 
11 of the Taipei Treaty incorporates the San Francisco Treaty, which explicitly waives 
individual claims; by extension, the Taipei Treaty also waives all individual claims. Tai-
pei Treaty, supra note 105, art. 11 (“[A]ny problem arising between the Republic of Chi-
na and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.”). The court in Nishimatsu ar-
gued that Japan relied on the terms in the Taipei Treaty during the negotiation process 
that preceded the signing of the Joint Communiqué, despite the fact that the People’s 
Republic of China was not a party to the Taipei Treaty. 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 36. It looked 
at the subjective intent of the Japanese government during the negotiation process and 
found that, “with regard to the conclusion of war [between Japan and China] and the 
termination of all war reparation and other claims, the Japanese government could only 
but rely on the premise that all these matters had already been resolved in the [Taipei 
Treaty] in a formal manner.” Id. (author’s translation). 
 134. Id. at 36–37. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 37. 
 137. Id. at 34–35. 
 138. Id. at 37. 
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bring suit; their claims were deemed to be waived, as understood within 
the overarching framework of WWII’s conclusion.139 
The effect of Nishimatsu is that it conclusively legitimizes Article 5’s 
waiver within the Japanese courts and clarifies its ambiguity by deter-
mining that it extends to both government war reparation and individual 
claims.140 Since Japan is a civil law country without a firm doctrine of 
stare decisis, the structure of the court system is such that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions are technically not binding on inferior courts.141 How-
ever, the decisions are nonetheless tremendously influential and followed 
almost without exception.142 Nishimatsu leaves a strong precedent for 
lower courts to follow, and it is highly unlikely that it would ever be con-
tradicted by a lower court.143 It would appear that hereafter, Chinese 
WWII-era victims have very little chance of having their claims heard in 
Japan. 
IV. THE LEGITIMATE AIM TEST APPLIED TO WWII CHINESE SLAVE 
LABOR LITIGATION IN JAPAN 
This Note proposes that, because of the ambiguity in Article 5 of the 
Joint Communiqué,144 the ECHR’s “legitimate aim” test is appropriate to 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. CHARLES F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 444 (2004) (“A 
decision of the [Japanese] Supreme Court, like all other judgments, binds only the parties 
to the action in front of the court. The civil law does not recognize starie [sic] decisis and 
hence the court’s reasoning is, in theory, not controlling on the lower courts in future 
cases.”). 
 142. Id. Goodman explains that Japan’s Civil Code strongly encourages uniformity 
within Japanese case law, which “in essence direct[s] the [lower courts] to follow the 
Supreme Court’s precedent—as if it were starie [sic] decisis.” Id. 
 143. Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Nishimatsu, as recent decisions 
affirm, the lower courts have clearly followed its reasoning. See, e.g., Associated Press, 
Japanese Court Rejects WWII Forced Labor Lawsuit, INT’L HERALD TRIB.: ASIA-PAC., 
Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/19/asia/AS-GEN-Japan-Forced-
Labor.php (reporting that the Toyama District Court dismissed claims of Korean slave 
labor plaintiffs on the basis that “war-related claims had already been settled under post-
war peace and compensation treaties”); Leslie Schulman, Japan High Court Dismisses Chi-
nese WWII Slave Labor Suit, JURIST, June 28, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/ 
06/japan-high-court-dismisses-chinese-wwii.php; Theage.com.au, Chinese WWII Slaves Miss 
out on Compo, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Chinese-WWII- 
slaves-miss-out-on-compo/2007/08/30/1188067198546.html (noting that the Maebashi 
District Court, in dismissing the claims of Chinese slave labor plaintiffs, “appeared to 
take its cue from [Nishimatsu, which] ruled [that] individual Chinese citizens lost their 
right to seek redress from Japan following [the Joint Communiqué]”). 
 144. Since the Japanese Supreme Court in Nishimatsu found that Article 5’s waiver 
was ambiguous, see Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 36, even while holding that the 
262 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:1 
apply to the slave labor situation in Japan to determine whether the Chi-
nese government legitimately waived the claims of its citizens, and there-
fore, whether the conclusion of the Japanese Supreme Court—that Ar-
ticle 5 applies to all Chinese claims—should be overturned. In applying 
the ECHR’s test, a court would have to determine whether the Chinese 
government: (1) had a legitimate aim in waiving the claims of individual 
victims of war; (2) this waiver of claims was a proportional means to that 
legitimate aim; and (3) the “very essence” of the Chinese litigants’ right 
to bring their claims was not impaired by the waiver.145 It becomes clear, 
when applying the legitimate aim test, that a court would likely deter-
mine that the ambiguous waiver does not legitimately annul the claims of 
the Chinese individual plaintiffs and would allow their claims to proceed 
on the merits. 
A. The Legitimate Aim Element 
A court would likely find that the People’s Republic of China had a le-
gitimate aim in waiving its citizens’ war-related claims through Article 5 
of the Joint Communiqué. In determining that Germany had a legitimate 
aim in waiving postwar property claims, the ECHR focused on the fact 
that Germany was in a highly compromised position, with the pressing 
need to regain its sovereignty following the war.146 In contrast, when the 
People’s Republic of China signed the Joint Communiqué, bloodshed 
and warfare had ended two decades earlier, and the communist govern-
ment was securely established, albeit not unanimously recognized by all 
other world powers.147 Based on the historical facts enumerated by the 
Japanese Supreme Court, China’s primary purpose for entering into the 
Joint Communiqué was to obtain Japan’s legal recognition of its newly 
established communist government and its complete ownership of the 
territory of Taiwan.148 In addition, China had the overarching goal of 
reestablishing friendly relations and economic intercourse with Japan.149 
These are certainly weighty policy considerations, but clearly the tem-
poral and situational circumstances of China were not nearly as grave as 
                                                                                                             
waiver applies to individual claims, this Note concludes that Article 5’s waiver is ambi-
guous for purposes of satisfying the ambiguity threshold before applying the legitimate 
aim test. For the reasoning this Note adopts in requiring an ambiguity threshold as a pre-
requisite to the legitimate aim test, see supra note 22. 
 145. See Prince Hans-Adam II of Liech. v. F.R.G., App. No. 42527/98, 2001-VIII Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1, 23 (2001). 
 146. See id. at 25–27. 
 147. See Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 34. 
 148. See id. at 36. 
 149. See generally Joint Communiqué, supra note 17. 
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they had been for Germany at the time it waived its citizens’ claims, and 
therefore the purpose in waiving was not as significant. 
Though it may be useful for challengers of the waiver to distinguish 
the goals of the waiving nations by degree of urgency, ultimately, it 
would probably do little to persuade a court that the People’s Republic of 
China did not have a legitimate aim under these facts. Certainly, Germa-
ny’s situation was extreme, and obviously, it had a legitimate purpose 
because it had no choice but to waive the claims of its citizens at the 
time.150 However, that does not mean a less extreme situation, like Chi-
na’s at the time of the Joint Communiqué, would not also be legitimate, 
as long as it was not frivolous or unwarranted. Therefore, since the 
People’s Republic of China did have significant policy justifications for 
Article 5’s waiver, though by degree not as compelling as Germany’s, a 
court would likely find that China had a legitimate aim. 
B. The Proportionality Element 
A court would probably find that the individual claim waiver of Article 
5 did not bear a “reasonable relationship of proportionality”151 to China’s 
legitimate goal of attaining legal recognition from and establishing a col-
legial relationship with Japan. The court in Liechtenstein considered 
Prince Hans-Adam II’s property claim insufficient to “outweigh the vital 
public interest in regaining sovereignty and unifying Germany.”152 It then 
concluded that Germany’s action of waiving such property claims was 
reasonably proportionate to its legitimate aim of reestablishing itself.153 
In contrast with property appropriation, however, there appears to be 
general consensus that the prohibition against slave labor is an accepted 
jus cogens norm.154 It is clear that jus cogens norms have increasingly 
powerful influence in international law, and waivers of jus cogens 
breaches should be taken particularly seriously.155 Furthermore, Germa-
ny’s situation at the time it waived its citizen’s property claims was much 
more critical than China’s at the time it signed the Joint Communiqué.156 
Under these circumstances, the balance between a waiver of jus cogens 
slavery claims against China’s primary aim of legal recognition appears 
much less proportional, especially when compared with the balance that 
was drawn between Germany’s grave circumstances and its waiver of 
                                                                                                             
 150. See Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 26–27. 
 151. See id. at 23 (discussing the proportionality element). 
 152. Id. at 29. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 48, art. 41, cmts. 1–14. 
 156. See discussion supra Part IV(a). 
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relatively impotent property claims in the Liechtenstein case.157 Accor-
dingly, the scales tip in favor of the Chinese litigants owing to the gravity 
of their jus cogens claims, creating a stark imbalance. Therefore, after 
finding that jus cogens claims had been waived for relatively insubstan-
tial reasons, a court would likely find that Article 5 was not proportional 
to China’s legitimate aim. 
C. The “Very Essence” Element 
A court would probably find that the “very essence” of the right of 
Chinese slave labor victims to have their claims heard is impeded by  
Article 5’s waiver. The court in Liechtenstein was impressed by the fact 
that there was another, more appropriate, forum for the plaintiff’s claims 
in Czechoslovakia and thereby determined that the very essence of his 
right had not been impeded by his nation’s waiver.158 Thus, the court  
illustrated that the very essence of a claimant’s right to bring a claim is 
not impeded by a treaty waiver when there exists another forum in which 
to bring his or her claims.159 In the case of the Chinese slave labor vic-
tims, it would be difficult to imagine a more appropriate forum than   
Japan. As in Czechoslovakia, all possible defendants reside in the coun-
try (in this case, Japan), and it is the locus where the protested activity 
took place. Indeed, there does not appear to be any other tenable forum 
for the Chinese plaintiffs.160 Thus, the litigants would be left without  
anywhere to bring their claims and be likely to convince a court that the 
very essence of their right is impaired by Article 5’s waiver. 
                                                                                                             
 157. Andrea Gattini remarks on this, suggesting that Prince Hans-Adam II’s claim 
might have succeeded if the underlying harm he suffered was a jus cogens violation, not 
just a mere appropriation of property:   
[U]nder what conditions could or should a state disregard an obligation it un-
dertook not to allow claims or actions relating to property seized under certain 
circumstances elsewhere? The answer is, when the seizure was a breach of a 
peremptory norm of international law. It is difficult to characterize the Benes 
Decrees in that way . . . . 
Gattini, supra note 13, at 544. 
 158. See Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 28–29. 
 159. See id. 
 160. In fact, several Chinese and other WWII victims have filed actions against the 
Japanese government and certain Japanese corporations in the United States, but they 
have been unsuccessful, as American courts have largely refused to entertain their claims. 
See generally Haberstroh, supra note 14 (providing a discussion of WWII slave labor 
lawsuits in U.S. courts and an accounting of the plaintiffs’ failures therein). Even if 
American courts decided to entertain such cases, it would be a much more incongruous 
and inappropriate forum than the Japanese courts. 
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Therefore, the Chinese government’s waiver in Article 5 would likely 
fail the ECHR’s legitimate aim test in Liechtenstein and be declared 
invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
When applied to slave labor litigation in Japan, the legitimate aim test 
would likely weigh in favor of the Chinese slave labor plaintiffs, causing 
the claim waiver in Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué to be invalidated 
as to individual claims and overturning the Japanese Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nishimatsu. In waiving the WWII Chinese victims’ individu-
al claims through Article 5, though a court would be likely to find that 
the People’s Republic of China had a legitimate aim, it would also be 
likely to find that the waiver, in its termination of jus cogens claims, was 
not proportionate to that legitimate aim, and that the waiver frustrated the 
“very essence” of the Chinese victims’ claims because there does not 
exist any viable alternative forum in which to bring them. 
By using the slave labor litigation scenario as a test case, it becomes 
apparent that the ECHR’s legitimate aim analysis offers a viable method 
for balancing the powers and interests of governments with the rights of 
individual victims of war. Since nations require functional and foreseea-
ble rules in order to establish peace following warfare,161 the legitimate 
aim test should not apply unless the threshold question of ambiguity in a 
waiver provision has been answered; that is, for purposes of efficiency 
and public policy, if a treaty waiver is clear and unambiguous in relin-
quishing all individual claims, the question should end there, and the 
waiver should be upheld without any further analysis.162 However, when 
faced with an ambiguous treaty waiver, like Article 5 of the Joint Com-
muniqué, the legitimate aim test provides the means to effectively weigh 
the traditional governmental power to waive all war-related claims 
through peace treaties against international law’s increasing concern for 
human rights and the individual’s right to judicial recourse for harms 
suffered. 
From a human rights perspective, the ECHR’s test has great value. It 
places an emphasis on the “very essence” of the individual’s right to 
have his or her claim heard by requiring an alternative forum. In addi-
tion, it mandates that the government have sound policy reasons for 
                                                                                                             
 161. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 162. Since it is common for nations to be very specific in waiving claims postwar, see 
Gattini, supra note 3, at 366, it seems evident that governments would typically be able to 
avoid the legitimate aim test altogether by relying on the clarity of their well-tailored 
treaty language to dispel any claim of ambiguity. 
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waiving such claims,163 and thereby ensures that it does not dispense with 
them for frivolous or self-serving purposes. Finally, the legitimate aim 
test contains the proportionality requirement, which can serve as a valua-
ble method for balancing the interests at stake and determining overall 
fairness. Perhaps most importantly, the proportionality requirement, in 
weighing the interests, allows a court to underscore the increasing inter-
national significance of jus cogens norms, and to acutely assess instances 
where they are violated. 
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 163. In most cases, it appears that governments would not have a difficult time coming 
up with a “legitimate aim.” Indeed, securing peace following warfare would almost al-
ways automatically seem to qualify as a legitimate aim. Therefore, the tension in future 
cases potentially applying the legitimate aim test would most likely be found in the “pro-
portionality” prong. In this sense, it might be interesting to draw an analogy to U.S. con-
stitutional law and the equal protection clause in regard to gender discrimination, where 
finding an “important governmental interest” for a gender classification is just the door-
way to the more difficult question of whether the classification is “substantially related” 
to the achievement of governmental aims—in other words, whether the means of gender 
classification is “substantially related” (compare with “proportional”) to the “important 
governmental interest” (compare with “legitimate aim”) sought to be achieved. Cf. Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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